Nowadays, a great part of Internet content is not reachable from search engines. Studying the nature of these contents from a cyber security perspective is of high interest, as they could be part of many malware distribution processes, child pornography or copyrighted material exchange, botnet command and control messages, and so on. Although the research community has put a lot of effort into this challenge, most of the existing works are focused on contents that are hidden in websites. However, there are other relevant services that are used to keep and transmit hidden resources, such as P2P protocols. In the present work, we suggest the concept of Deep Torrent to refer to those torrents available in BitTorrent that cannot be found by means of public websites or search engines. We present an implementation of a complete system to crawl the Deep Torrent and evaluate its existence and size. We describe a basic experiment crawling the Deep Torrent for 39 days, in which an initial estimation of its size is 67 percent of the total number of resources shared in the BitTorrent network.
IntroductIon
In the early days of the Internet, crawling the web was a relatively easy task. Search engines were able to index almost all the contents in the web. However, after some time, web contents have considerably evolved to a more "dynamic" behavior; for example, web servers often use databases to build and serve dynamic web pages. As pointed out in 1994 by Jill Ellsworth, this evolution leveraged the apparition of the invisible Web. In 2001, Bergman [1] divided the web contents into a Surface Web, that is, the indexed content crawled by search engines, and a Deep Web, containing all the dynamically generated content as a response to query forms. Nowadays, the Deep Web is more generally defined as informational content on the Internet that presents any of the following characteristics:
• It is not accessible through direct queries made by conventional search engines.
• It is only accessed through specific and targeted queries or keywords.
• It is either not indexed or cannot be indexed by conventional search engines.
• It is somehow protected by security mechanisms, including login IDs and passwords, certificates, membership registrations, codes, and so on.
Crawling the Deep Web is a challenging task, not only due to the hidden nature of its contents, but also because of its large scale. In 2001, Bergman [1] estimated that the Deep Web was 400-550 times greater than the Surface Web, and other authors [2] gave some insights about its size, including more than 307,000 sites, 450,000 databases, and 1,258,000 interfaces, describing an increase in size by 3-7 times during the period 2000-2004. In 2007, some Deep Web directory services started to index databases in the web, although their coverage was still small, ranging from 0.2 to 15.6 percent [2] . In 2015, the data stored on just the 60 largest Deep Web sites was estimated to be 40 times larger than the size of the entire Surface Web [3] .
From a cyber security perspective, discovering and analyzing the structure and dynamics of this huge amount of hidden content is of paramount importance. Many illegal activities in cyber space are based on the existence of this hidden content. Common examples of this fact are the presence of malware propagation mechanisms, botnets communications, exchange of child pornography or copyrighted contents, and so on.
The use of services like peer-to-peer (P2P) is relevant to some of these illegal activities. As an example, some of the botnets studied in previous research works use command and control mechanisms that are based on existing P2P networks (parasite P2P botnets) [4] . Despite this fact, the crawling and analysis of the resources shared using these protocols has received little attention so far. Again, we can conclude that, from a cyber security perspective, studying the contents in P2P networks is essential.
In this article, we focus on the Mainline implementation of BitTorrent, the most used P2P network nowadays. The publication of a resource in BitTorrent is done by somehow sharing a torrent file containing metadata related to the content description and location of the shared resource. These torrent files are either published in the public web (specific websites for torrent files that are referred to as torrent-discovery sites herein) or simply sent to interested users in an out-of-band channel (email, deep web, IRC, etc.). This mechanism for publication led us to make an analogy with the classification of contents in the web, and divide the BitTorrent resources into two parts: those that are publicly announced in the web, which we denote as the Surface Torrent, and those that remain hidden to the general public and are shared in private communities, that is, the Deep Torrent. Note that the concept of Deep Torrent does not include only private torrents. In fact, in this work we do not consider private torrents, as they have been analyzed in other works [5] . We specifically focus on resources that are being announced by outof-band mechanisms instead of public websites, while still being shared in public trackers or DHT.
In the present work we focus on demonstrating the existence of such a Deep Torrent and evaluating its size. We propose the use of a combined crawler for both the Surface and Deep Torrent based on a Mainline monitoring module and a web crawler for torrent-discovery sites. The system combines the output of these two modules to obtain a list of Deep Torrent resources. We make an evaluation of the system for a 39-day period, extracting experimental results about the Deep Torrent. To our knowledge, there is no previous research published on analyzing or describing these phenomena.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the following section, some related work is presented. Following that, some fundamentals of BitTorrent-based networks are given. After that, the overall functional architecture for the proposed Deep Torrent crawling system is detailed. Then we describe the preliminary results obtained from our proposed system. The final section draws the main conclusions and points out directions for future work.
relAted Work
Since the work by Bergman in 2001 [1] , there have been some efforts in the research community to investigate the magnitude and features of the Deep Web. These efforts have been concentrated in two directions.
The first one is related to the understanding of the nature of hidden contents and the methodologies to automate data extraction from Deep Web sites [6] . The second direction of research is related to optimizing the number of queries used to dig the web in order to obtain the maximum percentage of hidden contents [7] . The first prototype of our system is aligned with the first direction of research, as we are really interested in getting an overview of the features of the Deep Torrent without caring too much about efficiency.
Additionally, there are works specifically focused on crawling torrent-discovery sites [8, 9] . These works are not really focused on extracting information about the Deep Torrent, as they are only able to get information about the torrent files publicly published in torrent-discovery sites (Surface Torrent). Among torrent-discovery sites, it is worth mentioning the existence of the so-called distributed hash table (DHT) search engines, which publish information (magnet links instead of torrent files) about resources being shared in the BitTorrent DHT. The first engine capable of searching the BitTorrent DHT was btdigg. This engine was active during our research period and closed in June 2016 for several months. It is currently active again under a different domain (https://btdig.com/). In December 2016, a new DHT search engine called Alphareign (https:// alphareign.se/) appeared. Up to our knowledge, these are the only DHT search engines up to date.
Regarding the research efforts related to monitoring activity in BitTorrent, in our previous work [4] we developed a monitoring system to detect files belonging to P2P parasite botnets. There are other similar approaches in the literature, like [10] [11] [12] . Unluckily, all of them are aimed to analyze some features of BitTorrent files without paying attention to the Deep Torrent phenomena.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the combination of both modules, that is, a Surface Torrent crawler in the web and a BitTorrent monitor, in a complete system to crawl the Deep Torrent is not present in the literature, and it represents a contribution of this work.
bIttorrent GenerAl concepts
The BitTorrent protocol is used to share resources among peers in a large network. For every resource shared in BitTorrent, the nodes of the network can play different roles: seeders are nodes that contain a complete copy of a shared resource; leechers are those that have partially downloaded the considered resource -note that leechers really download the parts of a resource not only from seeders, but also from other leechers -and finally, trackers are special nodes in the network that keep track of the leechers and seeders for every shared resource.
To locate the resources shared in the network, the BitTorrent protocol uses torrent files, which contain metainformation about resources and, when necessary, about their corresponding trackers. The 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the info section of a torrent file is called infohash, and it uniquely identifies a resource in the network.
Torrent files are stored in torrent-discovery servers (normally web-based) that allow users to search contents and then get the corresponding torrent file to start the corresponding download. Some examples of these torrent-discovery sites are https://thepiratebay.org/, https://torrentdownloads.me/ or http://extratorrent.cc/, among others.
Since 2005, the BitTorrent protocol implements a distributed operation mode that does not require the participation of trackers. It was first implemented in the Azureus torrent client (currently known as Vuze). In this operation mode, a DHT is used to store the correspondence among the resources and the peers that share them. Here, we could say that each peer plays the role of a tracker. Currently, there are two different incompatible implementations of DHT: Vuze and Mainline. Both are specific implementations of Kademlia [13] . In this article we focus on Mainline [14] , as its use is more widespread [8] .
Mainline uses 20-byte unique identifiers for both nodes and resources (infohash) in the DHT network. In the case of nodes, they are known as nodeIDs, and are randomly generated the first time a BitTorrent client is initiated. These identifiers will not change unless a user manually uninstalls the BitTorrent application or changes its configuration file. Even if a user changes its IP address, its nodeID will remain, and for this reason, we can assume that nodeID is a unique identifier per user.
In Mainline, a metric for the closeness between a DHT node and a resource is defined as the XOR operation between their corresponding identifiers: There are four queries in the Mainline DHT protocol:
• ping: verifies if a peer is alive and responsive.
• find_node: requests a node for the list of closest nodes to a given nodeID in its routing table. A response message is issued with the IP address, port, and nodeID of every node in this list.
• announce_peer: announces that a peer holds the resource (or a part of it identified by its infohash.
• get_peers: get a list of peers associated with a infohash. If the queried DHT node does not have this information, it returns the eight nodes in its routing table closest to the infohash supplied in the query. Then, if a peer wants to announce that it has a copy of a given resource infohash i , it has to first find the list of peers that are closest to infohash i . For this purpose, it sends get_peers messages that iteratively reach the nodes in the DHT containing this information, thus getting the response. After that, an announce_peer message is sent to the nodes in the list of peers. As this information expires after a timeout that depends on the client implementation (around 30 minutes), the announcing peer is responsible for re-announcing the tuple <IP:port,infohash i > over time.
Note that announcing the resources is a necessary condition to allow other nodes in the Mainline network to download them. Based on this fact, we reduce the problem of monitoring the shared resources to that of monitoring announce_peers messages in the network. In what follows, we describe how we manage to achieve this.
deep torrent crAWler
The proposed Deep Torrent crawler is based on two modules (Fig. 1): a Mainline monitor and a web crawler for torrent-discovery sites. The Mainline monitor module is in charge of obtaining the resources that are being actively announced in the BitTorrent network. In parallel, the web crawler extracts resources that can be found in torrent-discovery sites (Surface Torrent). Finally, both forms of data are combined to find the resources that are really being announced in the BitTorrent network but cannot be found in the torrent-discovery sites. Following our own definition, these would be the resources that belong to the Deep Torrent.
MAInlIne MonItor Module
The monitoring module for the Mainline network is based on our previous work [4] and is composed of two submodules: a node crawler and a message sniffer.
Node Crawler: The purpose of the node crawler is to obtain all the active peers in a specific zone of the Mainline network and to maintain the updating of this list. A zone of the network is defined as all the identifiers with a common prefix. For example, the crawler can monitor an 8-bit prefix zone by extracting all the active nodes in the network whose nodeID begins with the same eight bits.
The crawling process starts getting a list of nodes in the monitored zone, known_list, by recursively sending find_nodes messages to some hardcoded bootstrap nodes. Once it has a minimum number of known nodes, two threads are launched. One periodically asks the nodes in known_list about new ones, and the other thread receives their answers and registers the new nodes into known_list.
Message Sniffer: Its aim is to include our monitor node in the routing tables of the DHT nodes previously collected in known_list. To accomplish it, this module periodically sends ping messages to the DHT nodes, indicating that it is alive and responsive. In this process, we forge the source nodeID so that many different sybil nodes are included in routing tables. As we are interested in receiving the same messages as the nodes in known_list, the fake nodeIDs are chosen so that they are close to them.
In summary, the Mainline monitoring procedure works as follows. First, we obtain the active nodes of a specific zone by using the node crawler module. After that, we try to be inserted into the routing tables of these nodes by including our sybils as neighbors. As a result, legitimate nodes send announce_peer messages to our sybils when they are sharing a resource with infohash in the monitored zone. We log all these announce_peer messages into a database, registering the infohash of the announced resource, IP address, port, nodeID of the announcer node, and the message arrival timestamp.
Note that this module does not alter in any way the proper operation of the monitored zone. The only effect is that real nodes in the monitored zone will send some extra messages to our sybils.
Web crAWler Module
Recall that torrent-discovery sites publish torrent files that are used to start the download of a specific resource. These sites usually have a query interface that allows users to obtain information related to the searched torrent resources. Based on this information, a user is able to decide which is the best torrent file for downloading a given resource. In order to make our crawler capable of extracting this knowledge, we use two methods.
• Passive search: Information announced in the torrent-discovery sites is obtained by using Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds. • Active search: We also query special websites for the resources already identified in the monitoring of the Mainline network and focus on those that have not been previously identified in the rich site summary (RSS) data source.
Regarding passive search, RSS feeds of the monitored sites are periodically queried by our crawler, and all the announced resources are stored in a database of known resources. The information stored in this database is:
• Unique identifier of the resource (infohash) • Name of the resource • Size in bytes • Number of seeders and leechers • Timestamp at which this resource started to be shared • Website from which this information was obtained • Timestamp of the instant at which the crawler got the information The idea of the active search is leveraging the information already extracted from the Mainline monitor module to make a deeper search of indexed resources in the torrent-discovery sites. Here, all the resources identified in the Mainline monitor module that have not been found in the queried RSS are first identified. For each of them, using the infohash announced in Mainline, a new specific query is launched to certain websites that allow searching a torrent by its infohash. Only when a resource is not found at this point is it labeled as a hidden resource and stored in the Deep Torrent resources database.
MeAsureMent results
We monitored a part of the Mainline network for 39 days, from March 16, 2016 until April 24, 2016. During this period, two Mainline monitors were launched to monitor the zones with an 8-bit prefix equal to 0x09 and 0x10, respectively. This represents 128 of the complete Mainline network (2 zones of a size of 1 out of 256 each). As nodeIDs are randomly assigned, we consider that this sample is representative of the behavior of the whole Mainline network. The main reason to use two different sensors is to check if the obtained results are biased for a specific zone.
We have conducted a preliminary experiment to check the accuracy of our crawler when sniffing the infohashes announced in a given zone. Three different instances of the Mainline monitor have been launched in the same zone (0x09). In this setup, our estimation for the percentage of resources monitored by the Mainline crawler is the percentage of resources observed by the three sensors. Thus, any resource monitored by only one or two sensors is considered to be a non-observed resource in the monitoring (worst case). In Fig. 2 we can see that our estimation is that more than 90 percent of the resources are being monitored. Note that this number is in line with the performance already indicated in other works [11] .
A total of 321,962 different resources have been monitored during this period, 166,035 in the 0x09 zone and 155,927 in the 0x10 zone. We can see in Fig. 3 the evolution of the new infohashes discovered every hour during the first week in both zones. The similar behavior of both monitors lead us to the conclusion that these results could be generalized to other zones.
For each of the monitored resources we have stored every announce_peer message received, logging the infohash, origin nodeID, IP address and port, and timestamp. In Fig. 4 we can see the evolution of the number of peers communicating within the 0x09 zone for the first week of our monitoring period. The number of peers exhibit a periodic behavior with an increasing mean value that stabilizes after some days. Depending on the time of day, around 95,000 peers are actively sending/receiving messages to/ from our system.
As reported in the Sandvine 2015 report [15] , Asia is the continent with the highest percentage of BitTorrent usage. This fact is reflected in Fig.  5 , where we show the monitored IP addresses grouped by its continent geolocation. Note that, due to this greater percentage of users from Asia, we obtain a periodic wave showing the typical evolution in day/night traffic in Fig. 4 . In fact, using the time UTC+8 (China), the maximum number of peers is reached at 9 p.m. and the minimum at 4 a.m.
These resources have been shared by 86,915,611 different nodes (different nodeIDs) with 23,417,933 different IP addresses from all the continents. Note the huge difference between the number of nodes and IP addresses. This could be due to either the existence of network address translation (NAT) boxes or the use of sybil mechanisms. For example, DHT search engines like bitdigg make use of sybil procedures to collect information from a network, in a similar way as we are doing in our Mainline crawler. A prior inspection of these data showed that there are certain IP ranges that comprise a huge number of nodes. As an example, two IP ranges from Russia and Kazajstán contain 8 million and 6 million nodeIDs, respectively, presenting a mean value of 14,000 nodeIDs per IP. Due to this size, we consider it more likely that they have a sybil behavior than that they are NAT boxes. Estimation of the Deep Torrent Size: Using the web crawler module, we have conducted our passive search since December 20th 2015, receiving information from some of the most common torrent-discovery sites. First, we chose a metasearch engine, torrentz (https://torrentz.eu/), due to the fact that it allows searching information in a large list of other torrent-discovery sites. During the monitoring period, torrentz comprised a list of 29 torrent sites. 1 In addition, we also directly checked some of the more relevant torrent-discovery sites, including http://bitsnoop. com/ and https://piratebay.to/, among others. Finally, we also decided to collect information from https://btdigg.org/, the only DHT search engine at the time of the experiment.
Each of these sites generates a periodic report with the newest torrent resources, which are subsequently downloaded and stored by our crawler. Depending on the torrent-discovery site, the frequency of the crawling varies between 24 and 48 hours. As a result, we have stored in our database a total of 22,174,122 resources. Out of the 321,962 resources collected in the Mainline monitor module, we found 80,869 (25.12 percent) within the 22 million resources obtained by the web crawler.
For the rest of the resources (a total of 241,093), we conducted an active search using some of the most common torrent-discovery sites that allow finding torrent resources by using their infohash. After this, we only found information about 23,878 additional resources of our set. In the end, we have 217,215 unidentified resources, which supposes 67.47 percent of the monitored resources. This is our estimated size of the Deep Torrent. Note that these results are only a proof of concept, as more exhaustive search methodologies for the Surface Torrent could be followed. Anyway, the obtained percentage points out that the size of Deep Torrent is not negligible at all.
Exploring Features of Shared Resources: One application of the web crawler is to explore the meta-data included in torrent files to draw conclusions about the contents and the sharing mechanisms.
For example, we wanted to inspect the active duration of the sharing of resources in order to find out possible differences between the Deep and Surface Torrent resources. This duration is defined as the number of hours during which the monitor receives messages announcing a specific resource. The results can be seen in Fig. 6 . First, note that Deep Torrent resources are shared for less time. This is an expected result, as these resources are not publicly published in torrent-discovery sites and therefore are not expected to be very popular. Indeed, there are a total of 159,195 Deep Torrent resources with less than 5 hours of active duration, which supposes 73.29 percent of the total amount of Deep Torrent resources, while the number of Surface Torrent resources with less than 5 hours of active duration is 25,015 (23.88 percent of the total amount of Surdace Torrent resources). However, it is notable that many of the resources in the Deep Torrent are still being shared for a long time.
conclusIons And future Work
This article explores the Deep Torrent, that is, torrents available in BitTorrent that cannot be found by means of public websites or search engines. We discuss the necessity of studying its properties, proposing a system to crawl Deep Torrent resources that combines a Surface Torrent crawler for the web and a BitTorrent (Mainline) monitor.
For demonstrating the usefulness of the crawler, we have collected information from part of the Mainline network over 39 days, identifying a total of 321,962 resources. Among them, 32.53 percent belong to the Surface Torrent, that is, they can be found in torrent-discovery sites; and the remaining 
